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1
Abstract

This paper aims to show that art and film can operate as propaganda in subtle and
unintentional ways. Jacques Ellul called such propaganda “sociological propaganda.”
Recent work in philosophy has relied on the notion of intention in defining how
propaganda works to affect the beliefs and attitudes of its recipients. This paper argues
that intention is not a necessary condition for messages to be propagandistic and works to
decouple propaganda from intention. Because our current models rely on intention in
defining propaganda, recent work in philosophy cannot account for sociological
propaganda. Ellul’s gestures toward defining propaganda explicitly feature intention as a
component. Sheryl Tuttle Ross’s “epistemic merit model” of propaganda relies on
intention in its definition of propaganda. Similarly, Jason Stanley implicitly relies on the
notion of intention in defining the two types of propaganda in his book How Propaganda
Works. Decoupling propaganda from intention does not mean that any influential
message counts a propaganda; instead, a systematic connection must hold between the
message’s production and its effects. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s political
economic model of propaganda outlines one of the ways this systematic connection is
instantiated, but there are many others. Additionally, this paper explores what
phenomenon Jacques Ellul means to capture by the term “sociological propaganda” and
offers a pointed definition of the term. Finally, this paper will draw from the work of Rae
Langton and Caroline West to advance a mechanism for how sociological propaganda
works. Sociological propaganda works through a process of accommodation whereby the
audience adopts certain attitudes in order to understand the received image as a logically
coherent message. Accommodation relies on authority to be successful. As long as they
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take art and film to be authoritative, recipients risk adopting and reinforcing the attitudes
undergirding the piece.

2

Looking Past the Images

3

Looking Past the Images: Art and Film as Propaganda Apparatuses
Introduction
In an episode of the sitcom Just Shoot Me, Maya Gallo, the series’ protagonist,
convinces her boyfriend that they should try and befriend a couple they recently met at a
restaurant. “I want my life,” she says, “to be like those beer commercials.” (Gara, 2000)
Gallo relays aspirations of groups of friends enjoying a campfire together. What sense
can we make of Gallo’s report of the origin of her desire? While it seems uncontroversial
that a beer commercial can inculcate a desire for beer, can a beer commercial inculcate a
desire for a particular lifestyle?
If we take Gallo’s report seriously, we must answer yes. The art and film
(including television commercials) that we consume can influence our ideas, beliefs,
attitudes, and behaviors in subtle and unintentional ways. In his 1973 book Propaganda:
The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Jacques Ellul names this phenomenon “sociological
propaganda.” Recent philosophical work on propaganda has neglected this phenomenon.
Importantly, because recent propaganda models have the notion of intention built into
them, the models cannot account for this unintentional propaganda. This paper will seek
to decouple propaganda from intention in order to establish sociological propaganda as a
phenomenon worthy of consideration.
Removing intention as a criterion for propaganda does not mean that any message
that exerts influence counts as a piece of propaganda; rather, a systematic connection
between the production of the message and the message’s effects must exist. The
message “operates” to produce changes in attitudes or behaviors. Edward S. Herman and
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Noam Chomsky’s (2002) political economic model of propaganda outlines one of the
ways this operation occurs.
In order to understand the phenomenon of sociological propaganda, we must
explain the mechanism by which a work of art or a film, such as a beer commercial, can
inculcate such ideas without intending to do so. Here, the work of feminist philosopher
Rae Langton will be particularly useful. By drawing together various threads from her
work on explaining how pornography subordinates and silences women, I will articulate
a mechanism for how sociological propaganda works. Whether as explosive as a
Hollywood action picture or as benign as a commercial for a candy bar, art and film have
the capacity to exert profound influence upon our ideals, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors
in subtle and unintentional ways.
In this paper, I will accomplish four things. First, I will challenge current models
of propaganda by decoupling propaganda from intention. In other words, I will show that
messages can be propagandistic unintentionally. Second, I will argue that removing
intention from our propaganda models does not mean any influential message counts as
propaganda; rather, a systematic connection must exist between a message’s production
and its effects. Herman and Chomsky’s political economic model of propaganda outlines
one of the ways this systematic connection might hold. Third, I will explain what
phenomenon Ellul means to capture by the term “sociological propaganda,” and I will
define it as decentralized messages that unintentionally operate to affect the behavior or
attitudes of an individual by irrational means. Fourth, I will draw together threads from
Rae Langton’s work on pornography in order to develop a model for how sociological
propaganda works. In short, sociological propaganda works via a process of
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accommodation whereby recipients adopt certain attitudes in order to make sense of the
image. I will conclude the paper with a few remarks on the importance of media literacy
and with some directions for future research.
I. Decoupling Propaganda from Intention
Philosophers have advanced many models of propaganda that rely on intention.
This section examines three: Jacques Ellul’s (1973) gestures toward a definition of
propaganda, Sheryl Tuttle Ross’s (2002) epistemic merit model of propaganda, and Jason
Stanley’s (2015) supporting-undermining propaganda dichotomy. I will examine each
one in turn. Using pornographic images as an example, I will show that intention is not a
necessary component for propagandistic messages.
In his 1973 book Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Ellul does not
provide a pointed definition of propaganda, and in fact, he is critical of such an endeavor.
“[Many writers],” he writes, “establish a certain image or definition of propaganda, and
proceed to the study of whatever corresponds to their definition […]” (1973, xii) Ellul
does gesture toward a definition of propaganda. He concerns himself with understanding
propaganda as a method and a set of techniques. “In propaganda,” he writes, “we find
techniques of psychological influence combined with techniques of organization and the
envelopment of people with the intention of sparking action.” (xiii) He provides the
following rudimentary definition:
Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that
wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a
mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological
manipulations and incorporated in an organization. (1973, 61)
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Intention features prominently in both of these definitional gestures. In the first, Ellul
says propaganda has “the intention of sparking action.” In the second, a group employs
the methods of propaganda with the intention of bringing about “active or passive
participation.” I hope to show in this paper that intention is not a necessary component of
propaganda, i.e. that propaganda can be unintentional. If, as I suppose, intention is not
necessary for messages to be propagandistic, Ellul’s definitional gestures are incorrect.
Next, I turn to Sheryl Tuttle Ross’s epistemic merit model of propaganda.
According to Ross, propaganda occurs when the following four necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions are met:
(1) an epistemically defective message
(2) used with the intention to persuade
(3) the beliefs, opinions, desires, and behaviors of a socially significant
group of people
(4) on behalf of a political organization, institution, or cause. (2002, 25)
The second prong of Ross’s framework relies on intention in order to capture the
phenomenon of propaganda. But, according to Ross, the intentions behind the creation of
a work of art are not what we should evaluate. “When we evaluate the artwork,” she
writes, “we need to evaluate not only the conditions of its making, but also the conditions
of its use […] The intentions in a given use of art (or particular context) help determine
whether or not it’s propaganda.” (2002, 25)
Consider, as a toy example, a particularly egregious racial caricature created with
the intention of inciting violence against the group of people the caricature is said to
represent. The caricature is clearly a piece of propaganda according to the epistemic
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merit model. Now, imagine the victims of this caricature plaster their neighborhoods
with it in order to incite the caricature’s victims against the caricature’s creators. Even
though the caricature is being used in a way that contradicts its creators’ intentions, the
caricature still functions as a work of propaganda. We must look at the intention of a
work of art’s deployment in evaluating whether a work of art functions as propaganda.
Finally, let us look at the propaganda model advanced by Jason Stanley in his
2015 book How Propaganda Works. Stanley defines two types of propaganda which
“together exhaust the category of propaganda”:
Supporting Propaganda: A contribution to public discourse that is
presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to
increase the realization of those very ideals by either emotional or other
nonrational means.
Undermining Propaganda: A contribution to public discourse that is
presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to
erode those very ideals. (2015, 53)
A couple examples may help clarify. Both of these examples come from Stanley.
As an example of supporting propaganda, consider a ministry of health that
produces messages discouraging citizens from smoking cigarettes (Stanley, 2015, 59). A
real example would be the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ “The Real
Cost” anti-smoking campaign. One of their messages depicts an insect eating a
radioactive-looking soup; then, it keels over. The following caption accompanies the
image:
Hydrogen Cyanide: Found in Insecticide and Cigarette Smoke (2018)
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The message does not use facts and argumentation about the harms of smoking in order
to convince it recipients to refrain from the activity; rather, the message relies on the
intuitions of the audience to conclude that something that harms insects must be harmful
to humans. This does not accord with our collective understanding of chemistry.
Differences in physiology can lead to differences in toxicity. Take, for example,
theobromine, a chemical in chocolate. Dogs and cats metabolize the compound about
five times more slowly, thus accounting for chocolate’s increased toxicity for those
animals. In contrast, the average ten-year-old child would have to consume 16.3 pounds
of dark chocolate to die from theobromine intake (Pomeroy, 2013). The anti-smoking
message presents itself as embodying the ideals of public health, and if it is successful in
getting people to stay away from cigarettes, the message increases the realization of the
ideal of public health. As such, the message is supporting propaganda.
One of Stanley’s examples of undermining propaganda is the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2015, 61).
The Court presented its decision as an extension of free speech rights to corporations, but
because of the large influx of money and moneyed-interests into political campaigns, the
free speech of common citizens has been diluted. The net effect has been a reduction in
the ability of common citizens to voice their political opinions. Thus, the decision
undermined the ideal it purported to support.
Unlike Ellul’s definitional gestures and Ross’s epistemic merit model, Stanley’s
framework does not feature an explicit notion of intention, but an implicit notion of
intention undergirds his definitions. According to Stanley, both supporting propaganda
and undermining propaganda are contributions to public discourse that are “presented as
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an embodiment of certain ideals.” (2015, 53) The contributions either increase or erode
the realization of those ideals. Because the contribution to public discourse is presented
as embodying certain ideals, the contributor must intend to make a statement regarding
those ideals. This is not to say that the contributor intends to make a propagandistic
message; that the contributor’s message is propagandistic could be unintentional. But, in
order for a message to be presented as the embodiment of a particular ideal, the
contributor must intend for that message to be statement about that ideal.
How can these three frameworks deal with the phenomenon of pornography?
Susan Brownmiller calls pornography “the undiluted essence of anti-female propaganda.”
(1980, 32) Beverly LaBelle argues that pornography “functions as a type of propaganda
for male-supremacist attitudes.” (1980, 174) Here, pornography is taken to be distinct
from erotica. Pornography is defined as graphic and sexually explicit subordination of
women through images or words, whereas erotica is any sexually explicit material
(Langton, 1990, 332). If we take Brownmiller and LaBelle at their words, can any of the
three frameworks help us understand how pornography functions as a type of
propaganda? I will examine each one in turn in order to see whether and how they can
accommodate pornography as a type of propaganda.
Under Ellul’s framework, pornography does function as a type of propaganda.
Recall that two of the hallmarks of Ellul’s definitional gestures are techniques of
psychological influence and the intention of sparking action. Pornography does exert
influence on its viewers in order to spark a particular action. Pornography employs
sexually explicit images in order to facilitate the orgasms of its viewers. But, this fails to
capture what Brownmiller and LaBelle mean when they say pornography is propaganda.
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Their claim is not that pornography is propaganda in that it facilitates the sexual
gratification of its viewers; they claim that pornography is propaganda because it
inculcates anti-female ideas within its recipients. If the makers of pornography did not
intend for these ideas to be spread by their work, Ellul’s framework cannot account for it
as a type of propaganda.
Can Ross’s framework help us understand how pornography functions as a type
of propaganda? If propaganda spreads male-supremacist attitudes, it must surely do so in
an epistemically defective way. After all, pornography makes no arguments.
Pornography, then, meets the first criterion of Ross’s framework. The second criterion is
the intention to persuade. Does pornography have the intention to persuade its viewers to
change their attitudes? Does it intend to inculcate anti-female beliefs? The answers to
these questions seem to be a resounding no. Pornography seeks to provide a means of
sexual gratification. Any attitudes inculcated are merely unintended byproducts. We
must remember, though, that the intention to be analyzed is not only the intention behind
the work’s creation but also the intention behind its use. Can this nuance help us
characterize pornography as propaganda? If a pornographic work is used in a campaign
espousing the submissiveness of women, that work of pornography, according to Ross’s
model, becomes a work of propaganda. The intent we should be concerned with in our
evaluation is the intention of the work’s use. But, this does not capture what
Brownmiller and LaBelle mean when they say pornography is propaganda. Their claim
is not that pornography is used to advance an anti-female agenda; rather, their claim is
that pornography, in its common usage, works as anti-female propaganda. If
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Brownmiller and LaBelle are right, Ross’s framework cannot account for this
phenomenon.
Finally, let us examine how Stanley’s framework might help us understand
pornography as a type of propaganda. The core of Stanley’s notion of propaganda are
contributions to public discourse that are presented as the embodiment of certain ideals
and that affect, either positively or negatively, the realization of those ideals. We must
ask, then, of which ideals pornography is presented as the embodiment. In order for
pornography to be considered anti-female propaganda, as Brownmiller and LaBelle have
asserted, pornography, under Stanley’s framework, would have be presented as the
embodiment of anti-female ideals and increase the realization of those ideals, or it would
have to be presented as the embodiment of pro-female ideals and erode the realization of
those ideals. Pornography is presented as the embodiment of neither ideal. In fact,
pornography is presented as sexual fantasy. Any effects it has on attitudes towards
women are unintended byproducts.
If pornography functions as anti-female propaganda and if, as I suppose, it does
so unintentionally, the propaganda models of Ellul, Ross, and Stanley cannot account for
pornography as a type of propaganda. Ellul’s definitional gestures and Ross’s epistemic
merit model explicitly cite intention as a necessary component of propaganda. Stanley’s
dichotomy relies on an implicit notion of intention. We need a model of propaganda
divorced from intention. In the third section of this paper, I will advance a framework for
a type of propaganda that functions unintentionally. This “sociological propaganda” can
account for the subtle and unintentional ways art and films, including beer commercials
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and pornography, can influence their audiences. In the next section, I examine one of the
problems that arises in divorcing intention from propaganda.
II. The Systematic Connection between Production and Effects
If pornography unintentionally functions as propaganda, then our notion of
propaganda must be divorced from intention, i.e. messages can be propaganda by
accident. Divorcing intention from propaganda seems like a risky move. Does this mean
that any message that causes us to change our behaviors or beliefs in an irrational way
constitutes a propagandistic message? If this were the case, then almost any message
could be propaganda, and this over-application of the term would quickly erode its
meaning. To avoid this problem, I propose that for a message to be propaganda, a
systematic connection between the message’s production and its effects must hold.
Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) political economic model of propaganda highlights one
of the ways this systematic connection can be instantiated.
In their 2002 book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass
Media, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky advance a political economic model of
propaganda. Focusing on the U.S. news media, Herman and Chomsky outline five news
filters:
(1) The size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation
of the dominant mass-media firms;
(2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media;
(3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government,
business, and “experts” funded and approved by these primary
sources and agents of power;
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(4) “flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and
(5) “anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism.
(2002, 2)
The size, concentrated ownership, and owner wealth crowd out smaller voices and
disincentivize publishing information that upsets the current economic status quo. The
media’s reliance on advertising prevents the media from publishing stories that alienate
advertisers. The media’s reliance on government, business, and expert personnel for
primary source information keeps the media in fear of being cut off from these
information streams. The media must also be wary of upsetting large special interest
groups who can exert their influence by instituting boycotts of media firms and, thereby,
drive away advertising dollars. These filters limit what information gets distributed
through the news media:
The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving
only the cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourse
and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first
place, and they explain the basis and operations of what amount to
propaganda campaigns. (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, 2)
Unlike the models I outlined above, Herman and Chomsky’s political economic model of
propaganda does not rely on intention, but this is not surprising. Their enterprise is not to
explain characteristics of propagandistic messages but to explain how structural realities
of the media give rise to media biases.
Herman and Chomsky’s filters give rise is unintentional propaganda. By
marginalizing information, opinions, and stories that cannot make it past the five filters,
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dissenting voices become silenced. This marginalization is not the result of the intentions
of one centralized force; rather, the marginalization results from multiple parties exerting
their influence on the dissemination of information. As a result, the consumers of news
media reach an irrational conclusion – they consider alternative views as non-existent or
non-viable simply due to their silence.
If Herman and Chomsky’s political economic propaganda model is correct, they
have shown how structural features of the media industry can lead to the production of
messages that affect the attitudes of their recipients in subtle and unintentional ways.
What their model offers, then, is neither a taxonomy of propaganda types nor a
mechanism for how propaganda works; rather, their model provides a set of structural
features that cause propaganda in the news media.
The systematic connection between the production and the effects of propaganda
is not limited to the political economic model outlined by Herman and Chomsky. Let us
return to Maya Gallo’s beer commercial, with which I started the paper. The beer
commercial clearly works as intentional propaganda; advertisers created the message
with the intention of selling beer. But, the message also has some unintentional effects:
the message inculcates the desire for a certain way of life, one which includes camping
trips with friends. The images included within the beer commercial are intended to
support the project of selling beer, and they do so by preying on the tastes, fears, desires,
and aspirations of the target demographic. As a result of including these images, the
ideas upon which they are built are reinforced and spread within the commercial’s
recipients.
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Let us return to the example of pornography. Pornography presents itself as
sexual fantasy to aid in the sexual gratification of its viewers, but to be effective, it must
be responsive to the attitudes and fantasies of its target audience. As a result, these
fantasies and the attitudes that undergird them get inculcated and reinforced within the
viewers. For example, a pornographic film that depicts a favorable rape depiction may
simply seek to give a visual representation to a sexual fantasy, but it also operates to
inculcate and reinforce problematic ideas about rape within its audience.
In summation, divorcing propaganda from intention does not mean that any
message that exerts influence on its recipient constitutes a propagandistic message. A
systematic connection must hold between the production of the message and that
message’s effects. Herman and Chomsky’s political economic model of propaganda
outlines one of the ways that systematic connection can be instantiated, but there are
others. In projecting the tastes, desires, and aspirations of their target demographic,
advertisements, including beer commercials, operate to inculcate these attitudes within
their viewers. Similarly, by projecting the sexual fantasies of their audience,
pornography operates to inculcate the problematic beliefs that undergird those fantasies.
Having decoupled propaganda from intention and having posited a systematic connection
between the production and the effects of propaganda messages, the paper will now turn
to its third task: defining sociological propaganda.
III. Sociological Propaganda Defined
In the previous section, I argued that decoupling propaganda from intention does
not necessarily lead to a notion of propaganda that is too broad to be useful. This section
presents a model for a type of propaganda divorced from intention yet still limited in
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scope through the necessity of a systematic connection between production and effects.
Despite the flaws in his definitional gestures, Ellul laid the groundwork for this type of
propaganda. Following Ellul, I will call it “sociological propaganda.”
According to Ellul, sociological propaganda is “the penetration of an ideology by
means of its sociological context.” (1973, 63) “The existing economic, political, and
sociological factors,” Ellul continues, “progressively allow an ideology to penetrate
individuals or masses.” (1973, 63-4) Sociological propaganda operates in a much more
subtle fashion than propaganda with an overt message, e.g. an advertisement saying “buy
Budweiser,” a campaign leaflet reading “Trump is evil,” or a bumper sticker reading
“guns don’t kill, people do.” Such instances of direct propaganda have clear goals that
they are intended to accomplish. On the other hand, sociological propaganda is
spontaneous and “not the result of deliberate propaganda action.” (Ellul, 1973, 64)
Examples will help clarify. I will start with the example provided by Ellul and
then provide a few of my own. According to Ellul, much sociological propaganda gets
transmitted through film:
When an American producer makes a film, he has certain definite ideas he
wants to express, which are not intended to be propaganda. Rather, the
propaganda element is in the American way of life with which he is
permeated and which he expresses in his film without realizing it. (64)
Having been brought up within the American milieu, the producer could not help but to
have adopted a certain set of internal elements (attitudes) that reflect the social,
economic, and political realities in which he grew up. These internal elements include
value systems, stereotypes, beliefs about society, and even certain beliefs about what a
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film should depict. This list is not exhaustive. Inevitably, the film will be permeated
with the ideas and values of the producer in ways of which the producer is not fully
conscious. This effectively reproduces the same internal elements within the minds of
the filmgoers.
I suggest that sociological propaganda can operate in even more subtle ways to
integrate the recipient into the social body. Instead of being inadvertently permeated with
the value system of the creator, sociological propaganda can also work by reflecting the
current social, economic, or political reality. This reflection leads to the inculcation of
certain attitudes. Consider, for example, a romance film that depicts the blossoming
relationship of a man and a woman. Obviously, the overt message of the film is one of
entertainment, i.e. it seeks to entertain the audience. In this sense, the film is a piece of
direct propaganda. The film, however, is saturated with certain ideals about romantic
love. By consuming this film, filmgoers also consume those ideals about romance and
love.
More propagandistic messages saturate the film. How does the couple travel to
their date? Do they travel by public transportation, private car, Segway, or walking?
Unless it is needed as a plot device, the transportation system will likely be whichever
resonates most with the filmmaker, and this will be the product of the images he has seen
and the experiences he has had. This choice has large stakes. Because of the film’s large
distribution, the couple’s transportation choices will become contributions to the
audience’s milieu. As such, it will serve to habituate the audience to that form of
transportation. Importantly, neither the propagation of the ideals of romantic love nor the
habituation to certain forms of transportation is the intended goal of the film. The film
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seeks to take the audience’s money, leave them with a positive outlook to take to their
friends, and, perhaps, lead the audience to a particular conclusion about a problem in the
romantic sphere. But, these goals are built on assumptions and stereotypes about how
romance, love, and even transportation occur in society.
One might argue that sociological propaganda, as I have described it, could not be
an effective tool for integration. While the couple’s transportation choices may have
some effect on the attitudes of the audience, that effect would be so imperceptible as to
be negligible. This line of argumentation fails to recognize the breadth of sociological
propaganda. The romance film likely will not have a dramatic effect on the audience’s
attitudes towards transportation, but I argue, the repetition of the images will. That films,
in general, are saturated with images of automobiles and that automobile and automotive
advertisements dominate the media landscape operate to inculcate pro-automobile
attitudes within the population. In this way, sociological propaganda becomes more
effective when it accords with other propagandistic messages (both direct and
sociological) that operate within a particular population.
The lack of intention is a key component to sociological propaganda. By this I
mean the presenter of the image did not intend for attitudes at issue to be inculcated
within the audience. In the case of my example, the filmmaker did not intend to spread
certain ideas about transportation when making his film. Surely, the filmmaker intended
to have his subjects take a particular form of transportation, but the effect of its inclusion
is an unintended byproduct.
We find another element of sociological propaganda in Clifford G. Christians
1995 article “Propaganda and the Technological System,” in which he discusses the
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concept. “As its primary network,” he writes, “propaganda uses a horizontal interaction
between individuals through which to establish collective standards, peer pressure, and
group norms.” (162) The term “horizontal” comes from Ellul, who contrasts it with
“vertical propaganda.” According to Ellul, “vertical propaganda” is vertical in that “it is
made by a leader, a technician, a political or religious head who acts from the superior
position of his authority and seeks to influence the crowd below.” (1973, 79-80)
Horizontal propaganda, on the other hand, “is made inside the group (not from the top),
where, in principle, all individuals are equal and there is no leader.” (1973, 81) While
direct, i.e. intentional, propaganda can be either horizontal or vertical, sociological
propaganda is largely horizontal (Ellul, 1973, 81). This poses a problem. In what sense
can we call a Hollywood film sociological propaganda when there is a clear difference in
position between the filmmaker and the film’s audience? It is more useful to think of
sociological propaganda as horizontal in that it is decentralized. By decentralized I mean
that sociological propaganda does not come from a unified source. Pro-automobile
attitudes are spread via automobile and automotive advertisements seeking to sell
automobiles and related products and via Hollywood films that glamorize cars through
the chase and habituate audiences to their existence by the magnitude of the automobile’s
presence.
At this point, I will advance a definition of sociological propaganda.
Sociological propaganda: decentralized communicative acts that
unintentionally operate to affect the behavior or attitudes of an individual
by irrational means.
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That irrationality is a component of sociological propaganda should come as no surprise.
After all, sociological propaganda is unintentional; any semblance of rationality would
indicate a clear attempt at influence and, therefore, intention. “Operate,” here, captures
the systematic connection between the messages’ production and their effects.
In this section, I advanced a definition of sociological propaganda. Sociological
propaganda is irrational, decentralized, and operates to affect the behavior and attitudes
of an individual by irrational means. If sociological propaganda is a real phenomenon,
how does it work? In the next section, I will draw together threads from Rae Langton’s
work on pornography and advance a model for how sociological propaganda works.
IV. How Sociological Propaganda Works
If sociological propaganda is a real phenomenon, then we need a model to explain
how sociological propaganda affects the behaviors and attitudes of its recipients. This
section looks at two possible candidates. First, the section will examine Jason Stanley’s
mechanism for how propaganda works. Second, this section will draw together threads
from Rae Langton’s model for how pornography silences and subordinates women
(1993). As we shall see, Stanley’s mechanism cannot account for propagandistic images.
On the other hand, if Langton’s model succeeds with pornography, then we can extend it
to art and film.
Central to Stanley’s mechanism for how propaganda works is the distinction
between at-issue content and not-at-issue content. According to Stanley, the at-issue
content is “what is at issue in the debate”; the at-issue content is “the information asserted
by [an] utterance.” (2015, 134) To assert at-issue content is “to propose to add it to the
common ground” of information in a particular linguistic context (2015, 134). In
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contrast, not-at-issue content is “not advanced as a proposal of a content to be added to
the common ground”; rather, the not-at-issue content is “directly added to the common
ground.” (2015, 135) Consider one of Stanley’s examples:
It was John who solved the problem (2015, 135).
The message asserts that John solved the problem. This is the at-issue content. The
message presupposes that the problem has been solved. This is the not-at-issue content.
The at-issue/not-at-issue content distinction leads Stanley to propose two distinct
models of how propaganda works:
Content model of propaganda: one kind of paradigmatic propaganda in a
liberal democracy would have a normal at-issue content that seems
reasonable, and would also have a not-at-issue content that is not
reasonable.
Expressive model of propaganda: one kind of paradigmatic propaganda in
a liberal democracy would have a normal at-issue content that seems
reasonable, and would also have a not-at-issue effect that would decrease
the empathy for a group. (2015, 140)
Stanley takes “reasonableness” to be one of the primary ideals of liberal democracies
(2015, 81). This concludes my outline of Stanley’s mechanism for how propaganda
works. Leaving aside his two types of propaganda (supporting and undermining), his
mechanism includes two types of content (at-issue and not-at-issue) and two possible
models for how propaganda works (the content model and the expressive model). Can
Stanley’s framework account for sociological propaganda?
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In a review of Stanley’s book, Jonathan Wolff argues that Stanley’s reliance on
the at-issue/not-at-issue distinction comes with a cost: Stanley’s analysis cannot be
extended to images (2016, 558-9). Stanley does admit that his mechanisms are incapable
of explaining how images work in propagandistic ways (2015, 127). Consider, for
example, Hubert Lanzinger’s 1935 painting Der Bannerträger (“The Standard Bearer”).
It depicts Adolf Hitler wearing plate armor, riding a black horse, and holding the Nazi
flag in his right hand. Imbued with set-pieces of a medieval knight, Lanzinger depicts
Hitler as a heroic warrior and leader of the German people. The painting depicts the
ideals of heroism and will either increase or erode the realization of that ideal. As such,
Stanley’s propaganda types can account for the painting as a propagandistic message.
Our analysis breaks down when we try to ascertain the at-issue content and the not-atissue content of the painting. What is the at-issue content of the painting? The painting
shows Hitler as a hero, but it does not propose to add this “fact” to the common ground.
Instead, the painting presupposes that Hitler is a hero. It seems, then, that the painting is
purely not-at-issue content.
Having shown that Stanley’s mechanisms explaining how propaganda works
cannot account for images, can Stanley’s types of propaganda account for sociological
propaganda? Seemingly not. Sociological propaganda is unintentional and, therefore,
does not present itself as embodying any ideal. Let us return to the example of
pornography. Does pornography present itself as embodying a certain ideal? Perhaps, it
claims to embody the ideals of sexiness. If so, does it support or undermine the
realization of that ideal? This seems impossible to answer. Sexual tastes vary widely
among individuals. Or, consider a film that takes place in the suburbs of a large city.
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Everyone travels via car. Such a film works as propaganda in that it normalizes the car as
a form of transportation, but it does not do so by presenting itself as the embodiment of
an ideal. The film simply reflects selected aspects of reality; through that reflection,
ideas, stereotypes, and expectations are inculcated and reinforced.
Let us now turn to the work of Rae Langton. Langton argues that certain kinds of
pornography “work as a kind of propaganda” when they “help to form and propagate
certain views about women and sexuality.” (1990, 335) To explain how this works,
Langton and Caroline West draw from the work of David Lewis and argue that a rule of
accommodation operates in the context of pornography (1999, [8]). During normal
conversations, the rule works in the following way:
If at a given time something is said that requires a component of
conversational score to be a certain way, in order for what is said to be
true, or otherwise acceptable; and if that component is not that way
beforehand (and if certain further conditions hold); then at that time, that
score component changes in the required way, to make what is said true,
or otherwise acceptable. (1999, [7])
This means that if in a conversation a statement that makes a presupposition goes
unchallenged, the information that is presupposed gets added to the conversational score,
i.e. the presuppositions get added to our pool of common knowledge. Langton and West
extend the rule of accommodation to pornography:
While it may not explicitly be said in pornography that women are
inferior, or that sexual violence is normal or legitimate, it may be that
propositions like these are presupposed by what pornography explicitly
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says, because they are required for the hearer to make best sense of what is
said. (1999, [8-9])
Langton and West use a ‘favorable’ rape depiction as an example. Imagine a
pornographic scene in which a woman repeatedly refuses the sexual advances of a man.
During the rape the follows, the woman is overcome with ecstasy. Although the scene
never explicitly states that the woman wanted to be raped and that “no” meant “yes,”
“these presuppositions are required in order to make sense of what is explicitly said and
illustrated.” (Langton & West, 1999, [9])
Langton offers the following general scheme of accommodation:
If – (1. Utterance) – at time t something is said […]; and
(2. Requirement) – a score component is required to be a certain way […],
in order for what is said to be correct play […]; and
(3. Counterfactual Dependence) – the component would not otherwise be
that way at t, though it was that way before; and
(4. Conditions) – certain conditions hold […]; then
(5. Creation) – at t the score component is that certain way […], enabling
what is said to be correct play […] (2015, 15-6)
I argue that we adopt a similar framework for imagistic forms of communication. By
“correct play” Langton means a kind of success condition; this could be acceptability,
truth, or Austin’s notion of “felicity” (2015, 5). In the case of images, we can use a
principle of coherence such that the elements of the image must hang together in a
logically connected way. Langton’s Counterfactual Dependence offers a modal
alternative to Lewis’s (1979) Novelty condition, i.e. that the component wasn’t that way
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before. Either one will work for our scheme. At times, sociological propaganda will
create new components (Novelty); at others, it will strengthen or sustain existing ones
(Counterfactual Dependence). The condition that must hold is authority. For
accommodation to be successful, the speaker must have authority over the message’s
recipient (Langton, 2015, 4). With my proposed adjustments, the scheme for imagistic
accommodation follows:
If – (1. Image Presentation) – at time t an image is presented […]; and
(2. Requirement) – a score component is required to be a certain way […],
in order for what is depicted to be correct play […]; and
(3.) – either Novelty or Counterfactual Dependence holds; and
[(3.1 Novelty) – the component wasn’t that way before; or
(3.2 Counterfactual Dependence) – the component would not
otherwise be that way at t, though it was that way before]
(4. Conditions) – certain conditions hold […]; then
(5. Creation) – at t the score component is that certain way […], enabling
what is depicted to be correct play […]
We can then model Langton and West’s “favorable” rape depiction using my scheme:
If – (1. Image Presentation) – at time t an image is presented [a favorable
rape depiction, i.e. a woman is shown enjoying being raped]; and
(2. Requirement) – a score component is required to be a certain way [The
woman wanted to be raped; her “no” really meant “yes”], in order for
what is depicted to be correct play [a coherent image]; and
(3.) – either Novelty or Counterfactual Dependence holds; and
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[(3.1 Novelty) – the component wasn’t that way before; or
(3.2 Counterfactual Dependence) – the component would not
otherwise be that way at t, though it was that way before]
(4. Conditions) – certain conditions hold [The image’s presenter has
authority]; then
(5. Creation) – at t the score component is that certain way [The woman
wanted to be raped; her “no” really meant “yes”], enabling what is
depicted to be correct play [a coherent image]
The model can also account for even more subtle forms of sociological propaganda –
propaganda that normalizes certain behaviors. Consider a film or television show in
which every scene depicts the consumption of cigarettes or other tobacco products.
Importantly, the characters pay no attention to their consumption. Our scheme may look
like the following:
If – (1. Image Presentation) – at time t an image is presented [the
unchallenged consumption of cigarettes is depicted]; and
(2. Requirement) – a score component is required to be a certain way [the
consumption of cigarettes is normal/uncontroversial], in order for what is
depicted to be correct play [a coherent image]; and
(3.) – either Novelty or Counterfactual Dependence holds; and
[(3.1 Novelty) – the component wasn’t that way before; or
(3.2 Counterfactual Dependence) – the component would not
otherwise be that way at t, though it was that way before]
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(4. Conditions) – certain conditions hold [The image’s presenter has
authority]; then
(5. Creation) – at t the score component is that certain way [consuming
cigarettes is normal and acceptable], enabling what is depicted to be
correct play [a coherent image]
Because the Novelty clause is not essential, the image does not need to create new
attitudes. Instead, it can reinforce existing ones.
We must remember that this propagandistic message does not exist within a
vacuum. How propagandistic messages play off each other is important. Imagine a
brutal senate campaign in which each of the two major candidates accuses the other of
being corrupt, of using their current office to benefit members of their family, and of
failing to be representative of “the issues voters care about.” A voter who receives both
of these direct propaganda messages may conclude that neither candidate is “right for the
job.” If third-party candidates receive little to no media exposure, the voter may think he
has only two bad options and may ultimately decide not to vote. Similarly, sociological
propaganda messages play off each other. Consider a film with a stereotypical
representation of a gay man. He is effeminate, flamboyant, and overtly sexual. If it
exists in isolation, the film forces us to accommodate this representation by adopting a
component like the following: at least one gay man is effeminate, flamboyant, and
overtly sexual. The film, though, does not exist in isolation. Instead, the film exists
within an array of messages in which gay men are depicted as effeminate, flamboyant,
and overtly sexual. As a result, the component added via accommodation will look like
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the following: all gay men are effeminate, flamboyant, and overtly sexual; or, gay men
just are effeminate, flamboyant, and overtly sexual.
Thus far I have assumed that the images (or their presenters) have the authority to
force these types of accommodations. Accommodation, for Langton, represents an
illocutionary act of speech, i.e. accommodation is an act “a speaker performs ‘in saying’
something.” (2015, 3) Without the right kind of authority, an illocutionary act cannot be
performed. Without the right kind of authority, accommodation fails. Do art and film
possess the authority to make illocutionary accommodations?
Langton and West provide a reason to be skeptical but offer a refutation (1999,
[13]). If the accommodation is made by a fictional image, is not the resulting component
fictional as well? If, during the course of a film, a person shoots a beam of light from a
wooden rod, accommodation leads us to adopt the belief that magic is real. But, this new
belief in magic does not extend to the real world; it remains isolated to the fictional world
to which the film gives us access. This argument, however, understates our ability to
learn from fiction. We tell fairy tales to our children to impart moral knowledge. We
watch period dramas to see what life was like centuries ago. “If we can gain true beliefs
from fiction,” Langton and West write, “we can also gain false beliefs from fiction.”
(1999, [13]) This intuition seems correct. As they note, the majority of fiction is built on
background conditions that are purported to be true in order to lend realism to the
fictional representation. Langton and West call these “background propositions,
propositions which (whether implicit or explicit) are true in the fiction, and true in the
world as well.” (1999, [14]) These background propositions lend credibility to a film or
work of art that seeks to make commentary on some aspect of the real world. If the

Looking Past the Images
29
audience takes the background propositions of a film or artwork to be true representations
of reality, the audience accepts them as authoritative.
Problematic cases arise when the background propositions are false but purported
to be true (background lies) or when distinguishing between the factual background
propositions and the fictional elements is difficult (background blurring) (Langton &
West, 1999, [14-15]). The myth that all black men are well endowed can be seen as
stemming from either of the two situations. It could be the case the pornography with
‘hung’ black male characters presents the falsehood as a true background proposition. It
also might be that such pornography blurs the distinction between the background
propositions and the fictional elements. In such pornographic images it is unclear
whether the ‘hung’ black male trope is a background proposition or a fictional element.
Either way, such pornography results in the inculcation of sexual stereotypes about black
men through the accommodation process.
Importantly, sociological propaganda is not limited to artworks and films in which
background lies or background blurring occurs. Even when all of the background
propositions are true, sociological propaganda works to integrate its recipients within
their social, economic, and political realities. Let us return to the beer commercial
described by Maya Gallo. The commercial depicts friends enjoying beer around a
campfire. Such a scene has certainly happened in the real world. The process of
accommodation might lead the recipient to adopt the belief that such behavior is normal
or desirable. In this way, sociological propaganda, through the process of
accommodation, can integrate its recipients within their social, economic, and political
structures. The recipients adopt attitudes that hold those structures to be normal.
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If images demand accommodations be made by their audiences and if
accommodations require authority for their success, then sociological propaganda works
only if its recipients give its constituent messages authority. How much authority (i.e. its
strength and breadth) affects how sociological propaganda affects its recipients.
Sociological propaganda messages exhibit epistemic authority. Speakers have this kind
of authority based on their expertise and credibility (Langton, 2015, 18). If the audience
believes an imagistic message is built on true background propositions, the audience will
grant the message authority not only over the fictional world it depicts but also over the
aspects of the real world covered by those background propositions. These could include
human behaviors, defining characteristics of certain classes of people, and even how
humans interact with each other. The effect can be normalizing activities, reinforcing
attitudes, and sustaining stereotypes.
This section has offered a mechanism for how sociological propaganda works. If
sociological propaganda is a real phenomenon, accommodation can explain how it works
to inculcate and reinforce attitudes within its recipients. Imagistic accommodation occurs
when certain components must be adopted in order for the elements within an image to
cohere in a logically connected way. Accommodation only succeeds if the image is
granted authority.
Conclusion
Sociological propaganda is a decentralized communication phenomenon that
operates unintentionally to irrationally change the behaviors and attitudes of its recipient.
The accumulation of messages that demand certain accommodations leads to the
inculcation and strengthening of certain attitudes. In order for this accommodation to be
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successful, the recipients of these messages must give the images authority over a real
world. Without this authority, accommodation fails completely or succeeds only within
the fictional world to which the messages give the audience access. If the
accommodation model of sociological propaganda is true, it behooves us as a society to
place a greater emphasis on media literacy. We must become active consumers of media
and critically analyze the authority of the images in which we bathe. Furthermore, we
must be aware of the more subtle ways in which art and film can influence our attitudes
and behaviors.
This paper has worked to decouple propaganda from intention and has posited a
new type of propaganda – sociological propaganda. Additionally, the paper has shown
that because they rely on a notion of intention, the models of propaganda advanced by
Jacques Ellul (1973), Sheryl Tuttle Ross (2002), and Jason Stanley (2015) cannot account
for sociological propaganda. That propaganda can be unintentional does not mean that
any irrational and influential message counts as propaganda; rather, a systematic
connection must hold between the message’s production and its effects. Edward S.
Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (2002) political economic model provides an explanation
for the structural conditions that give rise to some sociological propaganda. They have
highlighted one of the ways this systematic connection can be instantiated, but many
more exist. Finally, the paper developed the accommodation model of sociological
propaganda by extending Rae Langton’s work on pornography to other types of imagistic
communication.
The accommodation model of sociological propaganda represents a starting point.
How sociological propaganda plays out through the internet must be explored if we want
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to understand how the internet has changed our attitudes. The accommodation model of
propaganda may also help explain how we have become so politically polarized. Media
consumption patterns have fragmented. It is possible that, as a result, different groups of
people have been the recipients of radically different sociological propaganda systems.
These radically different sociological propaganda systems may have inculcated radically
different attitudes within their recipients. I do not propose to provide answers for all of
these questions, but I hope the accommodation model of sociological propaganda has
been a step in the right direction.
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